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1. Introduction  
 
Governments implement a broad mix of innovation policy tools in order to correct 
market failures. Such public intervention is justified from a social point of view as a 
means of preventing underinvestment in R&D activities. However, the ultimate goal of 
this policy is concerned not simply with increasing private R&D expenditure, but rather 
with boosting productivity, economic growth, employment and welfare. 
 
R&D subsidies, together with tax incentives, have been broadly used as technology 
policy tools to correct market failures. Their implementation implies the use of public 
funds and, consequently, their impact has been assessed from various perspectives. 
Until recently, such evaluations have focused primarily on two criteria: the ability of 
subsidies to induce more R&D expenditure (input additionality) and their ability to 
generate more innovative outputs (output additionality).  
 
These criteria are today frequently complemented with that of so-called behavioural 
additionality, whereby the impact of public interventions is assessed in terms of the 
behavioural changes that are experienced by firms. Empirical evidence for this approach 
is relatively scarce because of the difficulties faced in making behavioural additionality 
operational (Gok and Edler, 2012). However, various studies (Falk, 2007; Autio et al., 
2008; Clarysse et al., 2009) have explicitly analysed behavioural changes in public 
supported firms, providing empirical evidence of the effects of behavioural additionality 
in public R&D funded projects.  
 
It seems, therefore, that public interventions can have behavioural effects and instigate 
change in the human resources of subsidized firms, playing a key role in strengthening 
human capital and technological know-how and in enhancing technology management, 
through the recruitment of personnel with specific capabilities and knowledge to 
undertake R&D projects.  
 
Here, after assessing the effect of R&D subsidies granted in Spain on the number of 
R&D employees, our main objective is to analyse the impact of subsidies on firm 
behaviour in terms of the recruitment of highly qualified human resources. To detect 
such effects we analyse the way in which R&D subsidies can affect the composition of 
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human resources engaged in R&D. First, we analyse occupation type and the 
responsibilities of R&D personnel, distinguishing between researchers, technicians and 
auxiliary staff. Second, we consider the level of education distinguishing between PhD 
holders, graduates and engineers, short-cycle tertiary and personnel with other non-
tertiary education. Such an analysis affords us a better understanding of the impact of 
these subsidies on the quantity and quality of R&D employees, and allows us to identify 
how subsidized firms allocate their additional funds to R&D projects as far as their 
human resources are concerned. 
 
R&D subsidies are granted by public agencies operating at different levels of 
government that may have different policy objectives (Afcha, 2011; Blanes and Busom, 
2004). Consequently, it is important to distinguish between levels of government 
(Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014), since these public agencies may influence firms’ demands 
for a specific type of R&D personnel to carry out their R&D projects depending on the 
selection criteria of the agencies. We focus our analysis on national and regional R&D 
subsidies, which are the most important in Spain in terms of the number of recipient 
firms and the size of budget. However, in the estimations, we control for other sources 
of public support including European R&D subsidies.  
 
The database used in this paper corresponds to the Spanish Technological Innovation 
Panel (PITEC) for the period 2006-2011. This database, built with the Spanish version 
of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), provides information on the occupation 
and educational level of R&D workers. The availability of these data means we are able 
to overcome the limitations identified by Thomson and Jensen (2013) regarding the lack 
of information that studies in this field face when seeking to examine the skills of 
individual R&D workers. Our estimation of the impact of subsidies is carried out by 
combining two non-parametric matching techniques – the coarsened exact matching 
(CEM) and the propensity score matching (PSM) methods. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical 
framework and summarises the empirical evidence concerning R&D subsidies and their 
impact on R&D employment. Section 3 describes the dataset and the methodology used 
in the evaluation approach. In section 4 we discuss the main results of the estimations 
and section 5 concludes.  
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2. Literature review and analytical framework 
 
2.1. Public subsidies and R&D employment  
 
In recent years the literature devoted to evaluating the impact of technology policy 
interventions has grown rapidly. This literature analyses the impact of policy tools on 
firms’ innovative performance indicators. The empirical evidence (David et al., 2000; 
García-Quevedo, 2004; Cerulli, 2010; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014) has focused 
primarily on evaluating the impact of public funding on R&D inputs, measured through 
R&D expenditures and R&D effort, and on R&D outputs such as patents, sales of new 
products or number of new products and processes. 
 
Recent papers propose complementing measures of input and output additionality with 
analyses of changes in firms’ behaviour attributable to public interventions. Falk (2007) 
finds that scope additionalities, in the form of more cooperation or more challenging 
R&D projects, arise when multiple policy interventions or continuous public support is 
provided. Autio et al. (2008) show that collaborative R&D programs, by enhancing the 
identification of subsidized firms with a community of practice, enhance learning 
outcomes in these firms. Similarly, Clarysse et al. (2009) shed some light on the 
organizational factors affecting input additionality. Specifically, their results point to the 
fact that companies reporting the highest learning outcomes also continue to invest in 
their absorptive capacity, and so they provide evidence of a strong correlation between 
input additionality and behavioural additionality.  
 
Numerous studies evaluating public intervention in technology policy analyse the 
impact of subsidies on private R&D expenditures and, although some examine the 
effects of subsidies on employment as a complementary indicator (Eshima, 2003; 
Lerner, 1999; Link and Scott, 2013; Wallsten, 2000), the number of studies using R&D 
employment explicitly as the dependent variable is very limited.  
 
Some studies (Goolsbee, 1998; Wolf and Reinthaler, 2008) use aggregate data to 
analyse the effect of subsidies on wages and on the number of employees. While 
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Goolsbee’s (1998) conclusions support a crowding out effect, showing that public 
financing increases the remuneration of the R&D personnel already engaged in R&D 
activities, Wolff and Reinthaler’s (2008) findings show that R&D subsidies stimulate 
both variables positively but that the effect is greater on R&D wage levels. 
 
Other papers use microdata to examine directly the effects of public subsidies on R&D 
employment. Falk (2006) evaluates the impact of public subsidies in Austria using the 
number of R&D workers as the dependent variable. Her results indicate a small but 
significant effect of R&D subsidies on R&D employment. Specifically, a 1% increase 
in public funds generates a 0.04% rise in R&D personnel. Piekkola (2007) reports 
positive effects for Finland in its proportion of R&D employees as well as productivity 
growth improvements in subsidized firms. These results coincide with those obtained by 
Ali-Yrkkö (2005), also for Finland, when analysing the impact of R&D subsidies and 
distinguishing between domestic and non-domestic employees and R&D and non-R&D 
employees. His results show that subsidies have a positive impact only in the case of 
domestic employees engaged in R&D activities.  
 
These studies capture the impact of subsidies on the increase in the number of R&D 
employees. Yet, the effect induced by subsidies on the composition of human resources 
engaged in these R&D activities has not, to date, been analysed in detail.  
 
Human resources constitute a key component in innovation and economic growth 
processes, as well as being a priority objective for technology policy. For instance, 
Griffith et al. (2004) stress the importance of human capital for technical change and 
innovation in OECD countries.  
 
Lundvall (2008) reports that higher levels of education allow adequate competences for 
assimilating technological change to be acquired. This, therefore, increases the 
importance of university graduates, since individuals with higher levels of education 
serve as a vehicle for the construction of innovative skills and learning capabilities, two 
essential elements for taking advantage of technological opportunities. In addition, the 
complexity and tacit nature of scientific knowledge implies a high cost in terms of 
knowledge transfer and exploitation. The recruitment of PhDs may help to overcome 
these problems, providing better ties with universities and public research institutions 
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(García-Quevedo et al., 2012) and serving as channel to bring the knowledge embodied 
in these graduates into industry (Stephan et al., 2004). 
 
Empirical approaches have identified a positive link between human resources and 
R&D and innovation from a variety of perspectives. Leiponen (2005) shows that there 
are significant complementarities between technical skills and innovation and that 
human capital is positively associated with innovative performance. As such, innovation 
policies need to take into account these interactions. Piva and Vivarelli (2009) conclude 
that there is a positive link between ex-ante available skills and R&D investment and 
that the improvement in a firm’s manpower skills may be beneficial for its innovation 
strategies. D’Este et al. (2014) also report a positive relationship between human capital 
and innovation showing that having a strong skill base has a significant impact on 
attenuating deterrents to innovation. 
 
The concept of behavioural additionality emphasizes the role of human resources as a 
key component in any evaluation of the benefits derived from public policies. This 
perspective, grounded in resource-based theory, stresses the importance that unique, 
rare and hard to imitate resources represent for firms and, hence, the importance of 
taking policy impact into account in terms of quality improvements recorded among 
employees. Georghiou and Clarysse (2006) argue that, rather than a simple increase in 
the number of employees, public funds should serve as an incentive to increase the level 
of qualifications of R&D staff members, enabling firms to attract the skills that allow 
them to acquire competitive advantages.  
 
Accordingly, public intervention should be oriented towards promoting the recruitment 
of human capital with the skills needed to acquire and use specific knowledge 
(Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). Recent contributions (Huergo and Trenado, 2010; 
Takalo et al., 2013) show that the degree of technical challenge and the potential of 
R&D projects positively influence the likelihood of receiving public subsidies. The 
development and execution of high-technology projects may require incrementing the 
human capital and making changes to the educational composition of the R&D staff. 
 
Georghiou and Clarysse (2006) describe various mechanisms of public intervention that 
may change firms’ strategies. The effects of technology policy may result in the 
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acquisition of higher levels of knowledge, the upgrading of personnel skills and 
improvements in technology management, as well as changes in the scale and length of 
R&D projects. Clarysse et al. (2009) is one of the few studies to provide empirical 
evidence of the impact of subsidies on organizational learning and technology 
management. However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous study has examined 
the impact of subsidies on the composition of R&D staff. 
 
2.2. Effect of R&D subsidies provided by different levels of government 
 
Recent evaluations stress the importance of considering the different levels of 
government that intervene in technology policy, because they may well use R&D 
subsidies to target different policy goals (Afcha, 2011; Blanes and Busom, 2004; 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2011; Fernández-Ribas, 2009; García-Quevedo and Afcha, 
2009).  
 
At the country level, a distinction should be drawn between subsidies originating from 
central government and those from regional governments. The rationale underpinning 
technology policy at the national level is the existence of market failures (OECD, 2008) 
and, thus, it seeks the creation of incentives to enhance the level of investment in R&D. 
Various empirical studies associate the objectives of national governments with the so-
called “picking-the-winners” strategy, which tends to focus its efforts on strengthening 
technological levels in medium-large firms, belonging to high or medium-high 
technology sectors and with projects requiring large amounts of private investment. 
Blanes and Busom (2004) show that national and regional R&D subsidies in Spain seek 
to fulfil different objectives and that firm size and human capital intensity play an 
important role in the concession of grants at the national level where subsidies are 
oriented, in the main, towards promoting high level, commercially viable, technological 
projects. 
 
The participation of regional governments in innovation and technology policy has 
increased substantially over the last two decades. Initially, these interventions were also 
made with the aim of correcting market failures. More recently, however, regional 
interventions have been more closely concerned with solving systemic failures. This 
perspective identifies other sources of failure that might hinder the smooth operation of 
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innovation systems and constitute obstacles for the development and economic growth 
of a region. Indeed, institutions such as the OECD (2008) suggest that technology 
policy at the regional level could be more effective in solving problems associated with 
i) a lack of innovative capacity in regional firms, ii) rigidities that prevent the correct  
configuration of institutions; iii) network and coordination problems related to the 
interaction between agents in the innovation system; iv) a failure to adapt frameworks 
so as to regulate economic activities and; v) lock-in failures motivated by practices and 
behaviour inhibiting the adoption of new methods. 
 
The objectives of regional technology policy may thus differ from those planned by 
national governments, and, as in most regions in Spain, they tend to be more closely 
oriented to developing technological clusters, broadening the base of small and 
medium-sized firms performing R&D activities and, more generally, to reducing 
technological gaps between innovative and non-innovative firms. 
 
These differences in the technology policy goals of the two levels of government 
suggest that there may well also be differences in the impact of their respective 
subsidies on business R&D expenditures and employment. National and regional 
agencies do not have the same criteria for selecting the R&D projects that are to receive 
subsidies and, as a result, different impacts can be expected. These differences may be 
especially marked in the case of R&D employment, whose main characteristics tend to 
be specifically related to the type of project proposed by the firms that apply for grants 
from public agencies. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Data description 
 
The data used in this study are taken from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel 
(PITEC). This database is compiled by the National Statistics Institute (INE) in Spain, 
which is advised in this task by a group of university researchers and sponsored by the 
Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT) and the COTEC Foundation. 
The panel database includes the annual Survey of Innovation in Companies, carried out 
8
 
 
annually by the INE, following the guidelines of the OECD’s Oslo Manual, which 
means it can be compared with similar European innovation surveys (Community 
Innovation Survey). The panel comprises 12,283 firms drawn from industrial sectors 
and services for the period 2003-2011. Here, we limit our study to the period 2006-
2011, given that some questions in the survey have changed over the years and some 
information is not available for the early years. The PITEC provides detailed 
information about R&D employment by occupation and level of education, or formal 
qualification, of the R&D personnel. Its panel structure allows lagged variables to be 
included to control for previous performance and the granting of subsidies so that the 
potential persistency in the allocation of public funds can be taken into account. 
 
Occupation data are classified in line with the criteria proposed by the OECD (2002) in 
the Frascatti Manual, distinguishing between researchers, technicians and other support 
staff employed in R&D activities measured in full-time equivalent (FTE). Education 
data also adhere to OECD guidelines and include the following categories: PhD holders 
(ISCED level 6), Graduates or Engineers (ISCED level 5a), Short-cycle tertiary (ISCED 
level 5b) and personnel with non-tertiary education (ISCED level 4 or below). Although 
a new version of the International Standard Classification of Education was published in 
2011, we use the categories from the 1997 version as these are the ones employed in the 
PITEC between 2006-2011. 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of R&D personnel classified by occupation and level of 
education. By occupation, researchers constitute the main group followed by technicians 
and auxiliary staff in R&D. By level of education, graduates and engineers are the most 
numerous group followed by personnel with short-cycle tertiary education, those with 
non-tertiary education and, finally, PhD holders. The number of PhD holders in firms in 
Spain falls below the respective OECD and EU averages (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-
Menéndez, 2005) but it presents an upward tendency in recent years.  
 
  
    Table 1 
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3.2 Methodology 
 
The evaluation of technology policy has evolved rapidly in recent years and traditional 
problems in the evaluation of R&D subsidies such as sample selection and endogeneity 
have been broadly analysed in the empirical literature (Cerulli, 2010). The first of these 
problems, sample selection, arises because it is only possible to observe the 
performance of those firms participating and obtaining public subsidies. In the second 
case, the variables used to measure the effect of public intervention (e.g. private effort 
in R&D) could be endogenously determined, if we assume that those firms performing a 
greater effort in R&D are more likely to be subsidized. 
 
Most of the recent studies implement non-parametric matching techniques to solve these 
problems. Propensity score matching (PSM), as a matching method for the estimation of 
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), has been used extensively in 
empirical studies on the effects of R&D subsidies (see, among others, Aerts and 
Schmidt; 2008; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Carboni, 2011; Czarnitzki and Licht, 
2006; Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2013; Duch et al. 2009; Duguet, 2004; González and 
Pazó, 2008; Herrera and Nieto, 2008). 
 
Following this literature, we use non-parametric techniques. Specifically, two matching 
techniques are combined in order to ensure the maximum degree of similarity between 
control and treated groups. These techniques are, in first place, coarsened exact 
matching (CEM) as proposed by Blackwell et al. (2009) and, in second place, PSM as 
proposed initially by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Using CEM prior to the 
implementation of the subsequent matching techniques is suggested as an appropriate 
procedure for improving the quality of matching and the inferences after PSM 
(Blackwell et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 2012). 
 
Matching techniques allow the comparison of two potential results, W
1
 for those firms 
receiving the subsidy, D=1, and W
0
 for those firms not receiving any treatment (D=0). 
Matching is based on the conditional independence assumption (CIA), which states that, 
conditional on a vector of covariates, potential outcomes W
1
 and W
0
 are independent of 
D. In order to ensure the fulfilment of this assumption it is necessary to observe 
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exhaustively those variables affecting, simultaneously, the outcome and the reception of 
the treatment. 
 
The rich information provided by the PITEC allows us to select an exhaustive set of 
variables and to include similar variables to those used in previous evaluation studies 
(see, among others, Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Hussinger, 
2008). The availability of panel data offers, a priori, the possibility to combine 
matching techniques with a diff-in-diff estimator. However, the lack of information 
regarding the length of each project and the existence of multiple treatments, whose 
concessions follow irregular trajectories over time, hinder the establishment of a 
baseline year without loss of data. Yet, the sample size, and complete coverage for the 
remaining years, reduces this limitation when using PSM techniques.  
 
Taking advantage of the panel data structure, some lagged variables are included to 
control for the path dependence associated with the innovation process. This persistence 
is especially remarkable in the cases of R&D effort and the granting of subsidies 
(Antonelli and Crespi, 2013; González and Pazó, 2008). In addition, and as well as 
controlling for the granting of subsidies in t-1, we need to control for subsidies granted 
by other levels of government when estimating the effects of one specific source of 
public financing. 
 
In order to guarantee the similarity between treated and control groups, the first method 
used is the CEM, which allows covariates to be matched exactly. The main advantage of 
CEM over other matching methods is that the maximum imbalance of the empirical 
distribution is bounded through an ex-ante user choice. By choosing this imbalance ex-
ante, users can control the amount of imbalance in the matching solution. By so doing 
this method improves the estimation of causal effects and reduces differences between 
treated and control groups (Collins et al., 2011; Finseraas et al., 2011; Mason et al., 
2011).  
 
Iacus et al. (2012) outline how to apply the CEM technique. This can be summarised in 
the following four steps: 
 
1. Begin with the covariates X and make a copy – denote here as X*. 
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2. Coarsen X* according to user-defined cutpoints or CEM’s automatic binning 
algorithm. 
3. Create one stratum per unique observation of X*, and place each observation in 
a stratum. 
4. Assign these strata to the original data, X, and drop any observation whose 
stratum does not contain at least one treated and one control unit. 
 
CEM generates intervals for each variable submitted for comparison, coarsening 
observations into different subgroups. After coarsening each variable into substantively 
meaningful groups, the exact matching algorithm is applied to the coarsened data, and  
the values of the matched data are retained uncoarsened. 
 
The measure of imbalance in CEM is obtained following this formula: 
 
      (1) 
 
where   and  are relative frequencies of the discretized variables X1...Xk, for 
the treated and control units respectively.  
 
CEM estimation includes, in addition to the variables described in Table A.1, the 
number of researchers, technicians and auxiliary staff engaged in R&D for the period t-
1 and a set of industrial and service sector dummies.  
 
The data for the period 2006-2011 are treated as pooled data; thus, observations for the 
same firm in different years are considered as independent observations. However, to 
avoid comparing observations that correspond to the same firm in different years, 
matching is restricted to firms in the same year. 
 
After discarding variables with missing values, CEM is run, providing a sample of 
treated and control firms, matched exactly for a set of variables. The next step involves 
the implementation of a second matching method, in this case propensity score 
matching (PSM), on the sample previously matched with CEM. Rosenbaum and Rubin 
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(1983) define the PSM as the conditional probability of being treated given a vector of 
covariates X: 
 
( ) ( 1 ) ( )p X P D X E D X  
       
(2)  
 
where D is a dummy variable indicating the exposure to the treatment that takes values 
D= (0,1). Then, ATT is formulated as follows:  
 
 ( ) 1 (1) 1, ( ) (0) 0, ( )p x D E Y D P X E Y D P X           
   
(3)
 
 
where: 
Y(1) represents the expected outcome of subsidized firms. 
Y(0) represents the outcome of non-subsidized firms. 
 
The nearest neighbour matching (NNM) algorithm is used to construct the treatment 
and control groups. The two nearest neighbours for each subsidized firm, restricted to 
common support, are obtained. The set of variables used in the matching are described 
in Table A.1. 
 
4. Results  
 
4.1 Validity of the matching 
 
The validity of the matching constitutes a crucial step when applying these techniques 
and the main objective is to determine the similarity in the joint distribution of the set of 
covariates corresponding to the control and treated groups (Stuart, 2010). A common 
procedure to confirm if both groups are properly balanced involves estimating the 
standardized bias or the difference in standardized means, before and after matching 
(LaLonde, 1986; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
 
        (4) 
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Table A.2 in the appendix shows, for each variable, the reduction in bias achieved in the 
difference between treated and controls after the second matching procedure (PSM). 
The mean values for these variables do not present significant differences between 
controls and treated groups receiving national, regional or total public funding for R&D. 
 
4.2 The impact of R&D subsidies 
 
Table 2 shows the results corresponding to the effect of public subsidies for R&D 
activities, without distinguishing between the levels of government. These results 
correspond to different categories of R&D expenditures and number of R&D employees 
classified by type of occupation and level of education. 
 
In line with previous studies for Spain (Busom, 2000; González and Pazó, 2008; 
González et al., 2005; Herrera and Heijs, 2007), these results reveal the existence of 
financial additionality in private R&D expenditures. The estimations also show that 
public subsidies have a positive and significant effect on the number of R&D 
employees. These findings suggest, firstly, that there is a sufficient number of qualified 
employees to cover the firms’ demand for R&D workers. Secondly, public subsidies 
afford firms the possibility of increasing their stock of human capital and of allocating it 
to develop R&D projects, a fact that, according to the empirical literature, has positive 
effects on a firm’s productivity and innovative performance. 
 
Our data allow us to examine not only the magnitude of the increase in the number of 
R&D employees, but also to analyse the behaviour of subsidized firms taking into 
account certain characteristics of their R&D staff, such as occupation and educational 
level. This level of observation enables us to examine changes in the internal structure 
of the firm and to analyse if the subsidy induces changes in these two dimensions of 
R&D human resources. 
 
By occupation, the increase in the overall size of R&D staff induced by the subsidy 
leads to an increase in each of the three categories (i.e., researchers, technicians and 
auxiliary personnel), although the greatest growth is recorded in the number of 
researchers. By level of education, the increase in R&D personnel corresponds mainly 
to a rise in the numbers of graduates followed by personnel with other non-tertiary and  
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short cycle tertiary studies and, finally, PhD holders. In relative terms, the comparison 
of the structure of R&D staff (by both occupation and qualification) in the treated and 
control firms reveals no statistically significant differences. Thus, for example, the 
respective percentages of participation of researchers among R&D staff are 46.5 and 
48.8% for treated and control firms. Similarly, while 6% of the R&D staff hold PhDs in 
the treated firms, this percentage stands at 5.7% in the controls.  
 
These results show that subsidies generate an increase in R&D expenditures and an 
increase in R&D staff numbers, but that they do not bring about changes in the 
composition of R&D personnel. As such they are not responsible for generating any 
behavioural additionality effects in this specific dimension of the human capital of 
firms. R&D subsidies facilitate the recruitment of personnel and increase R&D staff 
sizes but they do not affect the decisions of the firms with regard to the composition (in 
terms of occupation or level of education) of their R&D staffs.  
 
The impact of public financing may differ depending on the firms’ characteristics as 
shown by recent empirical literature and its growing interest for analysing possible 
heterogeneous effects. This heterogeneity suggests that a firm’s reaction to public 
intervention may be conditioned by specific characteristics that influence the innovation 
process. In line with this, several papers analyse the impact of R&D subsidies on firms 
according to their size (Falk, 2007; González and Pazó, 2008; Lach, 2002; Ösçelik and 
Taymaz, 2008). In this paper, the possible existence of differences attributable to firm 
size is also analysed. Additionally, we take into account the type of R&D performed, be 
it continuous or occasional in nature.  
 
R&D subsidies are mainly granted to solve market failures and financial market 
imperfections that hamper access to finance for R&D projects. These failures primarily 
affect those firms that face difficulties in meeting the financial costs of R&D projects. 
Thus, differences in the impact of public subsidies on small and medium-sized firms, on 
the one hand, and on large firms, on the other, are expected, since the latter a priori face 
fewer financial restrictions and are less dependent on public funding. In order to test this 
hypothesis, ATT is estimated by splitting the sample in two groups, firms with 250 
employees or less and firms with more than 250 employees (Table 2). 
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The results show, firstly, the financial additionality effects of R&D subsidies for both 
types of firm for all categories of R&D expenditures, except in the case of private R&D 
expenditures in large firms. Secondly, R&D subsidies have a significant impact on the 
number of R&D employees. Thirdly, there is an increase in most of the categories of 
R&D employees, by occupation and or level of education, in both types of firm with the 
exception of technicians and graduates in large firms. Therefore, even in small and 
medium-sized firms, the granting of R&D subsidies leads to the recruitment of 
graduates and PhD holders. 
 
     Table 2 
 
With the aim of analysing the impact of public financing on firms performing R&D on a 
regular basis compared with those firms performing occasional R&D, ATT is estimated 
considering the frequency of R&D activities. While firms that perform R&D on a 
regular basis have, in general, long-term R&D strategies and stable R&D staffs, 
occasional performers do not, in many cases, have a formal R&D organisation. As such, 
different effects of public financing are expected in relation to the differences in the 
qualifications held by the staff members of both firm types and also depending on the 
characteristics of the projects subsidized. 
 
The results show an additional effect of public subsidies on R&D expenditures and an 
increase in the number of R&D personnel in the two types of firm. The growth in the 
overall size of R&D staff attributable to a subsidy leads to an increase in each of the 
three categories of occupation in both cases. Nevertheless, by level of education, there is 
no statistically significant impact on the recruitment of PhD holders for firms 
performing R&D on a regular basis. By contrast, our results show that for firms 
performing occasional R&D, public subsidies have a positive effect on the level of 
education of their R&D staff with a rise in the number of PhDs recruited and significant 
differences in the participation of PhD holders in the structure of the R&D staffs of 
treated and control firms. This result suggests that occasional R&D performers face 
human capital shortcomings when seeking to carry out new R&D projects and that the 
subsidies granted to these firms have behavioural additionality effects increasing the 
average level of education. 
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4.3 The impact of subsidies according to different levels of government. 
 
Previous analyses indicate, as discussed above, that technology policies implemented at 
different levels of government respond to different motivations. Table 3 shows the 
impact according to national and regional levels of public financing. Calls for 
applications for public subsidies from a specific level of government do not exclude 
firms already being subsidized by other levels of government. Consequently, in one 
given year, a firm can receive public subsidies from more than one source. To take this 
into account, ATT is calculated for each level of government, controlling for the 
possibility that subsidies may have been obtained from other public agencies. In 
addition, as a robustness check, Table 3 also shows the ATT estimation for those firms 
receiving just one subsidy in a given year, i.e. only national and only regional.  
 
The results show that public financing (both national and regional subsidies) has a 
positive effect on the number of employees; however, the magnitude of this effect is 
greater in the case of national subsidies. The respective impacts on the level of 
education of R&D staff in subsidized firms also differ significantly. Thus, while 
national subsidies have a positive effect on the recruitment of employees holding PhDs, 
the effect of regional subsidies is not significant.  
 
These results are consistent with the characteristics of the firms subsidised by the two 
levels of government and with the different objectives targeted by national and regional 
agencies respectively. Thus, Spain’s national government seems to adopt a “picking-
the-winners” strategy, promoting R&D and high-technology projects that require 
qualified personnel. By contrast, regional governments show a greater concern for 
promoting innovation (but not exclusively R&D) and for improving the links between 
the agents in their regional systems. Nevertheless, the recruitment of PhD holders 
attributable to national subsidies and the relative R&D staff structures of treated and 
control firms do not present any significant differences. These results therefore seem to 
confirm those obtained for total subsidies indicating that R&D subsidies do not generate 
behavioural additional effects in terms of the average level of qualification of R&D 
staff.  
 
     Table 3 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has analysed the impact of public subsidies on the composition of R&D 
employment. Despite its being a priority objective in technology policy, few studies 
explicitly examine this relationship. After confirming that subsidies serve to increase 
both total and private R&D expenditures, our estimations show that public support has a 
positive effect on the number of R&D employees. However, our results do not identify 
the existence of behavioural additionality effects. The increase in the size of the R&D 
staffs of subsidized firms does not lead to an improvement in the average level of 
qualification of the staff members. Therefore, public subsidies for business R&D 
projects do not seem to affect the decision of the firms with regard to the level of human 
capital of their R&D employees. 
 
Our results show that when evaluating the impact of R&D subsidies it is necessary to 
consider the multilevel structure of governments involved in the granting of subsidies. 
Indeed, our findings point to significant differences depending on the level of 
government. At the two levels considered - national and regional - subsidies have a 
positive effect on the number of R&D employees but in the case of regional subsidies 
there is no significant effect on the recruitment of PhDs.  
 
The analysis carried out is not free of limitations. First, as in most studies of this kind, 
information about the specific characteristics of the projects actually being funded is not 
available. Second, it is not possible to distinguish between subsidies granted by the 
various regional agencies that may have quite distinct innovation policy objectives. 
Third, the time period for which information is available is too short to distinguish 
between short- and potential long-term effects.  
 
Despite these limitations, this analysis has provided information about the effects of 
technology policy. Firstly, it confirms the existence of financial additionality as regards 
R&D expenditures and employees. Secondly, the results do not show that R&D 
subsidies lead to significant changes in the composition of R&D staff in subsidized 
firms and they rule out the existence of behavioural additionality effects on the level of 
education of R&D personnel. Therefore, without targeting public subsidies to this 
18
 
 
specific dimension, public support does not seem to have a significant impact on the 
improvement of the level of education of R&D staffs. These results also support the 
convenience of having, as many countries do, specific programs designed to incorporate 
researchers and PhD holders in firms as long as the innovation policy attempts to 
improve the human capital level of R&D staffs.  
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Table 1. R&D personnel by occupation and level of education (data in full-time equivalent, FTE) 
 Occupation Education 
Year Researchers Technicians Auxiliary 
Staff 
Total PhD Graduates/E
ngineers 
Short cycle 
tertiary 
Other non 
Univ. 
Total 
                  
2006 
2.677 0.942 2.188 5.80 0.331 1.330 2.738 1.408 5.80 
2007 
2.500 0.815 2.064 5.38 0.351 1.148 2.562 1.318 5.38 
2008 
2.596 0.793 2.121 5.51 0.391 1.173 2.639 1.306 5.51 
2009 
2.754 0.786 2.204 5.74 0.396 1.206 2.817 1.325 5.74 
2010 
2.803 0.760 2.371 5.93 0.430 1.138 3.053 1.312 5.93 
2011 
2.757 0.761 2.278 5.79 0.447 1.176 2.887 1.286 5.79 
                  
Total 
2.677 0.808 2.200 5.68 0.391 1.192 2.776 1.325 5.68 
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Table 2. Impact of R&D subsidies. Subsidies from any public administration.  
  Total 250 employees or 
less 
More than 250 employees Continuous R&D performers Occasional R&D performers 
Variable Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat 
Total R&D expenditures 110178.199 13.090*** 68332.063 11.700*** 167878.127 2.160** 86338.690 6.430*** 76089.642 7.470*** 
Private R&D expenditures 70402.441 7.830*** 46674.491 7.670*** 108386.239 1.270 49622.082 3.660*** 72039.418 7.240*** 
Internal R&D expenditures  78415.601 12.500*** 48425.174 10.820*** 130523.974 2.350** 65799.922 6.350*** 48230.870 9.660*** 
Total personnel in R&D 1.215 18.020*** 0.766 12.920*** 2.174 2.700*** 1.078 6.770*** 0.630 12.020*** 
Research personnel  0.528 14.060*** 0.317 10.130*** 1.245 5.170*** 0.397 5.280*** 0.276 10.630*** 
Technicians  0.473 12.830*** 0.282 9.790*** 0.628 1.010 0.513 4.800*** 0.234 8.530*** 
Auxiliary staff  0.215 12.390*** 0.167 8.430*** 0.301 2.470*** 0.168 4.520*** 0.120 7.760*** 
PhDs  0.072 7.540*** 0.037 3.500*** 0.073 2.070** 0.035 1.390 0.019 3.470*** 
Graduates  0.600 16.540*** 0.357 11.060*** 1.019 1.600 0.580 6.110*** 0.310 9.590*** 
Short cycle tertiary  0.240 8.990*** 0.135 7.170*** 0.506 3.100*** 0.178 3.210*** 0.124 7.960*** 
Non university degree  0.290 10.680*** 0.238 8.950*** 0.576 2.450*** 0.285 4.350*** 0.177 8.130*** 
Note: Statistically significant   ***99% and **95%.  
R&D expenditures are expressed in Euros and personnel in FTE. 
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Table 3. Impact of R&D subsidies by level of government 
  
National R&D 
subsidies 
Regional R&D 
subsidies 
Only National R&D 
subsidies 
Only Regional R&D 
subsidies 
Variable Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat 
Total R&D 
expenditures 
163846.95 3.68*** 78811.94 2.57*** 147274.21 2.91*** 31154.80 2.38*** 
Private R&D 
expenditures  
120619.91 2.43*** 55150.81 1.66* 100483.10 1.83* 9404.78 0.96 
Internal R&D 
expenditures 
132996.24 3.94*** 48028.88 2.74*** 130369.42 3.24*** 20293.85 2.03** 
Total personnel in 
R&D  
1.56 4.57*** 0.55 2.84*** 1.58 4.16*** 0.34 4.36*** 
Research 
personnel  
0.79 8.02*** 0.31 2.98*** 0.67 7.40*** 0.14 3.06*** 
Technicians  0.54 1.83* 0.16 1.93* 0.66 1.99** 0.13 3.78*** 
Auxiliary staff  0.22 5.23*** 0.08 1.88* 0.25 5.53*** 0.07 3.31*** 
PhDs  0.10 4.77*** -0.01 -0.13 0.06 2.46*** 0.01 0.40 
Graduates  0.88 3.34*** 0.31 3.09*** 0.91 3.15*** 0.14 3.12*** 
Short cycle 
tertiary  
0.20 4.10*** 0.15 3.95*** 0.20 3.62*** 0.09 4.02*** 
Non university 
degree  
0.37 5.28*** 0.09 1.83* 0.41 5.03*** 0.10 3.43*** 
Note: Statistically significant   ***99%, **95% and *90%. 
R&D expenditures are expressed in Euros and personnel in FTE. 
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Table A.1. Data description 
Variable Description  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
     
National subsidies 
Dummy=1 if the firm receives national 
subsidies, 0 otherwise 60799 0.18 0.39 
Regional subsidies 
Dummy=1 if the firm receives regional 
subsidies, 0 otherwise 60799 0.19 0.39 
European subsidies 
Dummy=1 if the firm receives 
European subsidies, 0 otherwise 60799 0.04 0.19 
Total subsidies 
Dummy=1 if the firm obtains receives 
subsidies  from some administration, 0 
otherwise 60799 0.29 0.45 
Total subsidies in t-1 
Dummy=1 if the firm receives  
subsidies from some administration in 
the previous year, 0 otherwise 60799 0.31 0.46 
Internal R&D in t-1 
Dummy=1 if the firm performs  
internal R&D activities in the previous 
year, 0 otherwise 60799 0.49 0.50 
Patents 
Dummy=1 if the firm applies for 
patents, 0 otherwise 60799 0.10 0.30 
Training 
Dummy=1 if the firm imparts training 
courses to its workers, 0 otherwise 60799 0.11 0.31 
International and private 
Dummy=1 for firms with 50% or more 
of foreign capital, 0 otherwise 60799 0.13 0.34 
Lack of internal funds 
Categorical variable between 1 (not 
experienced) to 4 (high importance) 
regarding the firm’s assessment of the 
lack of internal funds as a factor 
hampering innovation activities. 60799 2.31 1.14 
Group 
Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to a 
group, 0 otherwise 60799 0.40 0.49 
Size Total  number of employees 60799 312.57 1459.42 
R&D cooperation 
Dummy=1 if the firm engages in R&D 
cooperation, 0 otherwise 60799 0.19 0.39 
High technology 
Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to high 
technology manufacturing sector, 0 
otherwise 60799 0.05 0.21 
Medium-high technology 
Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to 
medium-high technology 
manufacturing sector, 0 otherwise 60799 0.17 0.38 
Medium-low technology 
Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to 
medium-low technology manufacturing 
sector, 0 otherwise 60799 0.15 0.36 
High technology services 
Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to high 
technology service sector, 0 otherwise 60799 0.10 0.31 
Researchers in t-1 
Number of Researchers in FTE 60799 2.63 15.30 
Technicians in t-1 
Number of R&D Technicians in FTE 60799 2.20 12.38 
Auxiliary staff in t-1 
Number of R&D Auxiliary staff in FTE 60799 0.80 4.41 
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Table A.2. Subsidies from National and Regional administrations. Difference of means test. Control and treated groups after matching  
 
  
TOTAL SUBSIDIES NATIONAL SUBSIDIES REGIONAL SUBSIDIES 
 Mean  T.test Mean  T test Mean  T-test 
Variable Treated Control % bias t Treated Control % bias t Treated Control % bias t 
    
 
    
    
Total Subsidies in t-1 0.676 0.679 -0.6 -0.31 0.556 0.560 -1 -0.23 0.595 0.604 -1.1 -0.30 
National Subsidies         0.131 0.126 2 0.51 
Regional Subsidies     0.239 0.239 0 0.00     
European Subsidies     0.010 0.008 2.3 0.48 0.007 0.0076 -0.4 -0.09 
Internal R&D in t-1 0.719 0.726 -1.6 -0.97 0.551 0.550 0.2 0.04 0.545 0.545 -0.1 -0.02 
Patents 0.057 0.059 -0.9 -0.46 0.033 0.028 3.6 0.75 0.024 0.023 1 0.25 
Training 0.069 0.070 -0.1 -0.06 0.057 0.051 3.3 0.71 0.040 0.039 0.8 0.20 
International and private 0.029 0.033 -2.1 -1.30 0.048 0.054 -3 -0.76 0.021 0.020 0.5 0.16 
Lack of internal funds 1.837 1.82 0.9 0.65   1.897 1.879 1.6 0.47 1.787 1.769 1.7 0.62 
Group 0.228 0.234 -1.4 -0.84 0.267 0.253 3.1 0.85 0.176 0.165 2.9 0.97 
Size 84.489 87.197 -0.4 -0.20 185.12 230.5 -3.8 -0.67 74.51 670.77 1.6 0.97 
R&D cooperation 0.283 0.268 4 1.93   0.204 0.188 5.2 1.09 0.181 0.176 1.5 0.38 
High technology 0.028 0.027 0.2 0.13   0.016 0.018 -1.7 -0.35 0.015 0.015 0.7 0.19 
Medium-high technology 0.178    0.183 -1.3 -0.75 0.185 0.199 -4.2 -0.98 0.159 0.159 0.2 0.06 
Medium-low technology 0.153 0.149 1.1 0.67   0.145 0.139 2 0.51 0.153 0.151 0.6 0.17 
High technology services 0.117 0.119 -0.9 -0.47 0.105 0.114 -3.4 -0.75 0.094   0.092 0.8 0.21 
             
 Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Pseudo R2 
LR 
chi2 p>chi2 Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 
 0.001 
 
10.58 0.719 0.002 6.86 0.976 0.000 2.53 1.000 
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